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ABSTRACT 
Efficient energy usage is a major design challenge in wireless sensor networks. In this paper, an 
efficient power control scheme that mitigates interference and reduces the energy usage of the 
sensor nodes in a wireless sensor network is presented using the game theory. A non-cooperative 
game was formulated among the sensor nodes in the modeled network by setting a transmission 
power limit at the receiving nodes which ensured that the transmitting nodes transmits at the 
optimal power level. The utility of the sensor nodes and the interference proportion within the 
network was evaluated at the optimal and discrete transmit powers. The Nash equilibrium of the 
proposed game was studied and it corresponds to a stability point where the network performance 
was optimized. Simulation results showed that the proposed scheme is effective for optimization 
of network resource utilization, reduction in the energy consumption of the nodes, increasing the 
transmission sum rate, reduction of interference within the network, and improving the network 
capacity.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Several autonomous sensor nodes working together to 
detect, monitor, and determine diverse operations, 
events or parameters at different locations are 
referred to as wireless sensor network (WSN). This 
networks are less expensive to set up because they 
require less infrastructures, they are multi-functional, 
capable of carrying out in-network analysis, embedded 
with sensing mechanism, able to process information, 
and are mostly deployed far from human intervention 
[1, 2]. Effective power control is a major limitation in 
the performance of this network because all the 
operations of the sensor nodes depend largely on their 
battery power and as a result, they use up their energy 
very fast [3]. A sensor node aims to transmit with high 
power in order to meet the required quality of service 
and to ensure successful packet delivery. This high 
transmit power increases the level of interference 
caused to the neighboring nodes which results in an 
increase in their transmit power. The effect of 
transmitting with high power causes jeopardy in the 
network and thus, it is of utmost importance that 
sensor nodes transmits at optimal transmit power to 
conserve their energy and to keep the interference 
proportion within the network at a minimal level.  
The nature of operation of WSN is different when 
compared with wireless heterogeneous network and 
wired network because the sensor nodes have 
restricted energy storage, communicate via short 
distances, lack global information, have varying 
network topology, and have limited computational 
capability [4 – 6]. These peculiarities in the operation 
of WSN has made the concept of game theory, which 
is an effective optimization technique, an important 
tool in analyzing interactive scenarios among decision 
makers in the design of WSN [3, 7, 8]. Game theory 
has been applied in several works of literature to 
propose different solution to the problem of power 
control in WSN and also in wireless cellular network as 
seen in [9 – 12]. A multi-source sensor network was 
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presented in [13] where the sensor node aims to 
transmit with an optimal power to achieve a target 
signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) at the 
master sensor. The work in [13] resulted in distance-
dependent attenuation with various path loss 
exponent but the interference from the master node 
was not considered which is in contrast to our 
formulated power control game where the optimal 
power of all the sensor nodes was determined by 
considering all the resulting interference from all 
transmitting nodes.  
In the work of [14], a power control algorithm with 
incomplete information was proposed and a Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium was used to determine the stability 
point in the proposed method. A price based 
distributed power control scheme was proposed for 
WSN in [15] while [16] and [17] focused on a 
restrictive energy distributed self-adaptive algorithm. 
The authors in these works aimed at reducing the 
energy consumption of the sensor nodes but the 
interference among the nodes during transmission 
was not considered. Motivated by these limitations, in 
this paper, we develop an energy-efficient power 
control scheme that mitigate interference between the 
sensor nodes, increases transmission sum rate, and 
improves the overall network capacity. The sensor 
nodes within the modeled network act as the players, 
their choice of transmitter power is their respective 
strategy and the utility of the nodes are measured in 
terms of transmission sum rate, reduced interference, 
and increased lifespan of the sensor nodes. A dynamic 
power threshold was set at each sensor nodes which 
ensures that all the transmitting nodes transmit at 
their optimal power and determined a utility function 
that incorporates both the transmission gain and the 
cost function which serves as a penalty for the nodes 
that transmit above the optimal power threshold. The 
sensor nodes update their power strategy as a result 
of this utility function and they aim to transmit at the 
optimal transmit power that maximizes their 
respective utility. 
The major contributions of this work includes: 
 Formulation of a non-cooperative power control 
game that reduces interference and energy 
consumption in a wireless sensor network by 
setting a power threshold at each sensor node.  
 Proposal of an appropriate utility function that 
maximizes the degree of satisfaction of the sensor 
nodes which was defined in terms of increased 
capacity and transmission sum rate. A cost 
function which is a measure of the amount of 
interference the sensor nodes cause during their 
active transmission was incorporated into the 
utility function and it serves as a penalty for the 
nodes transmitting higher than the set threshold.  
 Determination of the equilibrium point in the 
proposed scheme which is the stability point 
where the system performance is optimized. 
The remainder of this paper are as follows: Section 2 
presents the system model and assumptions of the 
power control game. Section 3 provides the 
illustrations of the proposed scheme and the proof of 
the existence of the Nash equilibrium. In section 4, the 
simulation results and technical discussions are 
presented while the conclusions of this paper are given 
in section 5. 
 
Figure 1: A system model of a wireless sensor network  
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2. SYSTEM MODEL 
A wireless sensor network that comprises of 𝑆 sensor 
nodes, a base station, and a server shown in Figure 1 
is modeled in this paper. All the sensor nodes in the 
network act as the players, their transmission power 
is their set of strategy, and their utility is a measure of 
increased transmission sum rate, reduced 
interference, and efficient energy consumption. The 
sensor nodes are distributed in an arbitrary manner 
within the network and are represented by set 𝑆 =
 {𝑆1, 𝑆2, 𝑆3, … , 𝑆𝑛}. The transmission power levels of the 
sensor nodes form their set of individual strategy and 
it is denoted by 𝑃 = {𝑃0, 𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3, … , 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥} where 𝑃0 
denotes the inactive state of the nodes, 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the 
maximum transmit power and 𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3 are any power 
level between 𝑃0 and 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥. The set of fixed strategy 
profile of all the sensor nodes is denoted by 𝑃𝑆 
where𝑃𝑆 = {𝑃𝑆1 , 𝑃𝑆2 , 𝑃𝑆3 , … , 𝑃𝑆𝑛} for sensor nodes 
𝑆1, 𝑆2, 𝑆3 up to𝑆𝑛. All the sensor nodes in the network 
have their unique power strategy profile, therefore, 
𝑃0, 𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3, … , 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∈ 𝑃,  𝑃𝑆1 , 𝑃𝑆2 , 𝑃𝑆3 , … , 𝑃𝑆𝑛 ∈ 𝑃𝑆  ⊆ 𝑃.  
The sensor nodes within the network are 
interconnected in a mesh topology and are able to 
send and receive information from the nodes in their 
neighborhood. A sensor node requires a minimum 
SINR to transmit its packet successfully to the 
receiving node. The SINR for sensor node 𝑆1 
transmitting with 𝑃1where 𝑃1 ∈ 𝑃𝑆1 is expressed as: 






,                      (1) 
where 𝑃1 is the transmission power strategy of sensor 
node𝑆1, 𝐺1 denotes the channel gain, 𝑃𝑆\𝑆1represents 
the power of all other transmitting sensor nodes 
except sensor node𝑆1, and 𝜎𝑛 is the background noise. 
The work assume that the nodes have omnidirectional 
antenna thus they can function as a transmitter and 
receiver, they are able to determine their transmission 
power, have a unique sensing coverage area, are 
aware of their channel condition, and the expected 
SINR of the receiving node which is obtained through 
periodic acknowledgement. 
 
3. GAME FORMULATION 
The problem formulated in this paper represents a 
typical non-cooperative game defined as 𝐺 =
[𝑆, {𝑃𝑆}, {𝑈𝑆1∈𝑆}], where 𝑆 is the set of the players, 𝑃𝑆is 
the set of their strategy profile, and 𝑈𝑆1∈𝑆is the set of 
their utilities. 
Definition 1: Let 𝑃1be the least transmit power 
necessary to achieve the SINR required for a 
successful packet delivery as defined in (1). 𝑃1 results 
in the maximum allowed interference at the 
neighboring nodes within the cluster. The maximum 
allowed interference proportion 𝐼 that the node can 
tolerate is set to be 𝛼 and is given for a transmitting 




 ≤    𝛼                                   (2) 
𝐼𝑆\𝑆1 is the allowed interference proportion to all other 
sensor nodes apart from sensor node 𝑆1. Any other 
choice of power strategy of sensor node 𝑆1that results 
in 𝐼𝑆\𝑆1 > 𝛼 will cause 𝑆1 to transmit at a cost which is 
defined in terms of its transmission power.  
 
Definition 2: The transmitting node transmits at a 
transmission cost per unit power 𝐶 at any other power 
strategy that results in interference proportion 𝐼 > 𝛼. 
The nodes update their power profile continuously to 
get the optimal transmit power that results in little or 
no transmission cost, reduced interference and energy 
consumption. The sensor nodes aim to transmit at this 
optimal power strategy that maximizes their utility and 
ensured successful packet delivery.  
The expression for the utility of the transmitting sensor 
node incorporates both the reward and penalty 
functions which is defined in terms of transmission 
rate and the cost per unit power incurred. The general 
utility function for any transmitting sensor node is 
given as:  
             𝑈(𝑆, 𝑃) = 𝐾 log2(1 + 𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅) −  𝐶(𝑃),       (3) 
where, 𝐾 is the utility gain per unit transmission rate 
of the sensor nodes,  𝐶(𝑃) is the transmission cost per 
unit power of the transmitting node. The cost function 
𝐶(𝑃) is given in equation (4) as: 
𝐶(𝑃) = 𝐼𝑃,                                               (4) 
where 𝐼 is the interference level received by the 
neighboring nodes from the transmitting node. 𝐼 is 
dependent on the transmit power and 𝑃 is the transmit 
power of the transmitting node. This cost function is 
simple and it satisfies the operation characteristics of 
WSN. Equation (3) is defined for sensor node 𝑆1 
transmitting to node 𝑆2 as: 






) − 𝐶𝑃,         
    ∀𝑃1∈𝑃𝑆1 .                            (5) 
The nodes are not aware of the power strategy of the 
other nodes, therefore, all the sensor nodes compete 
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repeatedly in a non-cooperative manner to maximize 




𝑈𝑆1(𝑆1, 𝑃1),     ∀𝑆1∈{𝑆 },              (6) 
   𝑠. 𝑡 ∑ 𝐼𝑆\𝑆1
𝑆𝑛
𝑆2
 ≤    𝛼.                                     (7) 
 
3.1 The Equilibrium Point  
Definition 3: Assume 𝑃1
∗, ∀𝑃1∗∈𝑃𝑆1∈𝑃𝑆 is a solution to 
equation (6). A Nash equilibrium exists for the 
proposed game if 𝑃1
∗ is non-empty, convex, and a 
compact subset of the Euclidean space. Also, if the 
utility 𝑈𝑆1(𝑆1, 𝑃1) is non-zero and continuous in 𝑃𝑆1 [3] 
[18]. 
Proof: Let 𝑃1
∗ be the optimal transmission power of 
sensor node 𝑆1. 







− 𝐶𝑃,            ∀𝑃1∈𝑃𝑆1 ,                           
𝑃1
∗ = arg max
𝑃1







− 𝐶𝑃,      ∀𝑃1∗∈𝑃𝑆1∈𝑃𝑆 ,                             (8) 
𝑃1
∗ is the optimal transmission power of sensor node 
𝑆1 and it is within the strategy space 𝑃𝑆1, therefore, 
𝑃𝑆1 is non-empty, convex and a compact subset of 
Euclidean space. 
𝑃0 < 𝑃1
∗ < 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥     𝑓𝑜𝑟 [𝑃0, 𝑃1
∗, 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∈ 𝑃 ⊆ 𝑃𝑆1],       (9) 
The players maximize their given utility for a 








+ 𝜎𝑛) + 𝐾𝐺1𝑃1)










+ 𝜎𝑛) + 𝐾𝐺1)
2 −  𝐶𝑃 
(11) 
           ∴      
𝜕2𝑈𝑆1(𝑆1, 𝑃1)
𝜕𝑃1
2 < 0 .                                   (12) 
It is seen in (11) and (12) that 𝑈𝑆1(𝑆1, 𝑃1) is concave 
over 𝑃𝑆1and thus Nash equilibrium exists in the 
proposed non-cooperative power control game for 
WSN where the optimum solution of the game 
is arg max
𝑃1
𝑈𝑆1(𝑆1, 𝑃1) for sensor node 𝑆1. 
 
4. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The performance of the proposed scheme was 
evaluated by computing the interference proportion, 
utility, transmission rate, transmission cost, and SINR 
of the sensor nodes. The simulation set up consist 10 
evenly distributed sensor nodes per cluster and each 
node can either act as a receiver or as a transmitter. 
For ease of computation, the nodes were modeled in 
an area of 150 × 150𝑚2 and at the coordinate of 50,50 
to the sink node.  
 
Table 1: Simulation Parameters, [3, 19]. 
Parameters Values 
Bandwidth 1MHZ 
Noise Power 5 × 10−15𝑊 
Channel Gain 7.75 × 10−13/𝑑𝑖
3.6 
Maximum Power 100W 
Minimum Power 0𝑊 
 
The nodes transmit within their coverage area, their 
power level is 0𝑊 during inactive state while the 
maximum allowable transmit power is 100𝑊. The 
simulation parameter is shown in table 1. The 
interference level at the receiving nodes and the 
resulting incurred transmission cost of the transmitting 
nodes were investigated at different transmit power 
for 𝑃 = {𝑃0, 𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3, … , 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥} ⊆  𝑃𝑆. The effect of the 
proposed scheme on the transmission cost and SINR 
versus the transmission power was shown in Figure 2 
and Figure 3 respectively. It was observed in Figure 2, 
that the transmission cost increases with increase in 
transmit power. Though the increase in power level 
ensured successful packet delivery, it does not result 
in efficient network resource utilization because the 
sensor nodes used up their energy very fast. Under 
the proposed scheme, the interference proportion was 
seen to be almost negligible before it increased 
exponentially. This exponential increase results in very 
low payoff values as seen in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 2: Relationship between Transmission Cost 
and Transmission Power 
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The sensor nodes achieved an SINR value required to 
deliver their packet to the receiving nodes at the 
optimal transmit power as seen in Figure 3. The 
interference proportion is measured in terms of the 
interference level received by the other nodes and it is 
dependent on transmit power. This discussion is in 
accordance with section 3 and it showed that, though 
the nodes achieved a higher SINR, but the SINR values 
did not result in a good utility value. The sensor nodes 
aim to transmit at the optimal power level that 
maximizes their utility and result in good transmission 
sum rate. The utility of the sensor nodes was 
investigated at different transmit power in Figure 4 by 
computing the transmission rate of the sensor nodes 
at optimal power and the transmission cost defined in 
terms of the interference proportion during 
transmission. The utility value increased gradually until 
it reaches the optimal point at 𝑃1
∗ after it began to 
reduce exponentially. This shows that at 𝑃1 > 0 ≤
𝑃1
∗, the transmission of the nodes results in a tolerable 
interference proportion and they incurred an almost 
negligible cost. At 𝑃1 > 𝑃1
∗,  the sensor nodes have low 
utility value and this further justifies the defined 
transmission cost which enforces a degree of 
cooperation between the sensor nodes.  
The transmission sum rate of the sensor nodes was 
evaluated under the interference power threshold and 
under different power level without the constraint as 
shown in Figure 5. It was observed that all the nodes 
have a higher transmission sum rate when they 
transmit at the optimal power level except for node six 
which was located at the farthest distance to the sink 
node. This is contrary to what was seen when the 
transmission cost was not imposed. The sum rates of 
the nodes that transmitted higher were greatly 
reduced because they incurred increase interference 
level. 
To further validate the performance of the work 
presented in this paper, the proposed model is 
compared with the scheme presented in the work of 
[13] where sensor nodes chose their transmit power 
independently to achieve a target SINR at the master 
sensor. The Pareto Optimality of their work was not 
verified and the equilibrium point is restricted and 
distance dependent. In our formulated power control 
scheme, the optimal power of all the sensor nodes was 
determined by considering all the resulting 
interference from all the transmitting nodes. We 
introduced a power constrain that results in the 
optimal power strategy of all the nodes and it results 
in an increased utility value, efficient energy usage, 
and reduced transmission cost when compared to the 
work presented in [13]. 
 
 
Figure 3: Signal to Interference Ratio at different 
Transmission Power. 
 
Figure 4: Utility at different Transmission Power 
under the Interference Constraint 
 
Figure 5: Transmission Sum Rate of different Sensor 
Nodes in a Cluster 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, a power control game model that 
reduces interference and energy consumption in a 
wireless sensor network is presented. A non-
cooperative power control game was formulated 
among the sensor nodes in the modeled network by 
setting a transmission power threshold at the receiving 
nodes which ensures the optimal transmission of all 
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the nodes. The utility function that incorporates both 
the profit and the cost function which ensures that all 
the sensor nodes transmit at their optimal power was 
defined and the existence of the Nash equilibrium in 
the proposed game was determined. The performance 
of the proposed scheme was evaluated and it results 
in increased transmission sum rate, reduced 
interference within the network, and increased 
lifespan of the sensor nodes. The work carried out in 
this paper can be extended to the other technical 
challenges in wireless sensor network which include 
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